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"AN OPPORTUNITY FOR EFFECTIVE CROSS-EXAMINATION":t
LIMITS ON THE CONFRONTATION RIGHT OF
THE PRO SE DEFENDANT
Alanna Clair*
The rights of a defendant to confront his accusers and conduct his defense without
the assistance of counsel are sacrosanct in the American judicial system. The
rights of the defendant are even sometimes exalted at the expense of the rights of the
public or of victims of crime. This Note examines the problem of a pro se defendant
using his confrontation right to intimidate or harass his alleged victims testifying
against him. It is well-established that the confrontation right is not uncondi-
tional. The problem comes in determining whether the courts can place limits on
the confrontation right of a pro se defendant in order to preserve the integrity of the
trial process. This Note advocates the appointment of standby counsel to supplant
the pro se defendant's cross-examination of a witness or victim who may be unlaw-
fully intimidated into testifying falsely if cross-examined personally by the
defendant.
INTRODUCTION
The Sixth Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant two
critical trial rights, among others: the right to represent himself
and the right to confront his accusers.1 Neither right, however, is
absolute. Even the confrontation right, a tradition carried down
through the "ancient roots"'2 of Anglo-American legal history, is
subject to limitations when the interests of justice so require. This
Note is concerned with the judicial system's interest in ensuring
truthful and uncoerced testimony from its witnesses. Here, the au-
thor envisions a situation in which a criminal defendant-likely
accused of rape, assault, kidnapping, or another violent and inva-
sive crime against a surviving victim-elects to represent himself at
trial so that he may terrorize the victim testifying against him. This
could induce the victim to testify falsely or refuse to testify out-
right.
3
t Kentucky v. Stincer, 481 U.S. 730, 739 (1987) (quoting Delaware v. Fensterer, 474
U.S. 15,20 (1985)).
* Alanna Clair graduated from the University of Michigan Law School in May 2008.
She is a litigation associate at McKenna Long & Aldridge LLP in Washington, D.C.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
2. Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 496 (1959).
3. Intimidation includes both inducing a witness to perjure himself and compelling a
witness to refuse to take the stand.
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Although the American criminal trial has been referred to as a
"theater of perceptions,' there is a very real and constant tension
between honoring the defendant's rights and protecting the inter-
ests of the public. The Supreme Court has already recognized the
susceptibility of certain kinds of witnesses by limiting the protec-
tions of the Confrontation Clause.' Therefore, it is not
unconstitutional for these restrictions, typically specific to cases
involving child witnesses, to be placed on the self-represented
defendant. The Supreme Court has written that the "right to
cross-examination, protected by the Confrontation Clause, ... is
essentially a 'functional' right designed to promote reliability in
the truth-finding functions of a criminal trial."6 The trial's truth-
finding functions are seriously hindered when a criminal defen-
dant improperly takes advantage of his right to represent himself
in order to pressure his alleged victims into testifying untruthfully
or refusing to take the stand.
Nonetheless, it is critical that the defendant's confrontation
right be preserved, even in the face of intimidation tactics used by
the defendant. The cross-examination of a witness, central to pre-
serving the confrontation right, however, should occur without
unlawful intimidation of the witness. A procedure employing
standby counsel to conduct the defendant's cross-examination,
rather than the defendant himself, preserves open courts and tes-
timony, "the most critical characteristic of the common law trial" in
the Anglo-American tradition.'
This Note submits that a judge should limit a defendant con-
ducting his own cross-examination of an accusing witness, and
could do so without running afoul of the Confrontation Clause or
the defendant's right to proceed pro se. Part I of this Note exam-
ines the right to represent oneself at trial and the subsequent
limitations to that right imposed by the courts. Part II traces the
history of the confrontation right and its dual purpose of ensuring
thorough cross-examination and a true determination of guilt or
4. Charles R. Nesson & Yochai Benkler, Constitutional Hearsay: Requiring Foundational
Testing and Corroboration under the Confrontation Clause, 81 VA. L. REv. 149, 150 (1995).
5. See Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990). Craig is still good law and has not been
expressly overruled by the Supreme Court. It should be noted, though, that it may be lim-
ited by the constraints of Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
6. Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 737 (1987). This does not mean, however, that a
court need engage in a case-by-case determination of whether each cross-examination it
oversees will assist in "truth-determination." Rather, when considering how the confronta-
tion right may be limited, a court should consider the truth-seeking function of a trial and,
in particular, cross-examination.
7. Richard D. Friedman & Bridget McCormack, Dial-In Testimony, 150 U. PA. L. REv.
1171, 1203 (2002).
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innocence at trial. Part II further describes the justifications courts
have employed when limiting the confrontation right, namely with
regard to child witnesses and forfeiture. Finally, Part III analyzes
the requirements of the Sixth Amendment and concludes that a
judge would not violate the Constitution by appointing standby
counsel to perform a cross-examination that might otherwise in-
timidate an accusing witness into committing perjury.
I. THE RIGHT TO SELF-REPRESENTATION"
A. The Importance of the Right to Self-Representation
The constitutional right to self-representation was established in
Faretta v. California and derived from the text of the Sixth Amend-
ment.9 In fact, "the right of self-representation finds support in the
structure of the Sixth Amendment, as well as in the English and
colonial jurisprudence from which the Amendment emerged."'"
The Sixth Amendment also affords all criminal defendants certain
trial rights: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right.., to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusa-
tion; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to
have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence."'1 The Sixth
Amendment has been read, therefore, as "constitutionaliz[ing] the
right in an adversary criminal trial to make a defense as we know it.
The Sixth Amendment does not provide merely that a defense
shall be made for the accused; it grants to the accused personally
the right to make his defense.
12
Since the Sixth Amendment grants the defendant the assistance
of counsel, the Court has noted that "l[t] he right to defend is given
directly to the accused [as opposed to his counsel]; for it is he who
suffers the consequences if the defense fails." 3 The defendant who
8. The author uses this term interchangeably with the "right to represent oneself"
and the "right to proceed pro se." Each term refers to the Sixth Amendment right of a
criminal accused to forego the assistance of counsel.
9. 422 U.S. 806 (1975). Anthony Faretta was a criminal defendant who requested to
represent himself at his trial for grand theft. Id. at 807. He was found guilty by a jury after
the judge refused Faretta's request and assigned a public defender to represent him. Id. at
809-11. The Supreme Court overturned Faretta's conviction and held that a criminal de-
fendant has the constitutional right to refuse state-provided counsel and represent himself,
as long as he does so intelligently and knowingly. Id. at 835-36.
10. Id. at 818.
11. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
12. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 818-19 (internal citations omitted).
13. Id. at 819-20.
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waives counsel may be at a disadvantage compared to the defen-
dant who retains the right, but "[tihe primary notion of waiver
protected by Faretta is the right to err. The primary benefit waived
is a competent spokesman." Although the pro se defendant may
be said to have a fool for a client, the Sixth Amendment jurispru-
dence underscores the importance of a defendant being ultimately
responsible for directing his own defense in spite of the potential
pitfalls. 5  As discussed below, though, the right to self-
representation is hardly absolute.'6
B. Constitutional Limitations Upon the Right to Self-Representation
The right to represent oneself in criminal proceedings has been
curbed for a host of reasons, ranging from the procedural to the
substantive. Among the former, courts may refuse requests to pro-
ceed pro se that are made in an untimely manner.7 Even when the
defendant is himself an attorney, a court may be justified in deny-
ing him the right to represent himself where granting the
defendant's motion could potentially result in undue delay and
jury confusion."'
A judge can also limit self-representation due to a defendant's
actions during his own trial.' 9 Where the defendant's courtroom
behavior is obstructive, he may not be allowed to represent him-
self.20 Once the trial has gotten underway, any motions for self-
representation are considered disruptive and are left to the trial
14. Richard H. Chused, Faretta and the Personal Defense: The Role of a Represented Defen-
dant in Trial Tactics, 65 CAL. L. REv. 636,678 (1977).
15. See, e.g., Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835 ("[A pro se defendant) relinquishes, as a purely
factual matter, many of the traditional benefits associated with the right to counsel. For this
reason ... [he] should be made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-
representation.")
16. See infra Part II.B for a discussion of how the confrontation right is similarly sub-
ject to some constitutional limitations.
17. See, e.g., United States v. Edouard, 253 F. App'x 905 (11th Cir. 2007) (holding that
defendant was not entitled to proceed pro se where he first alerted the court he wished to
proceed pro se after the government began its closing statement); Wood v. Quarterman, 491
F.3d 196, 202 (5th Cir. 2007) (trial court need not permit defendant to proceed pro se
where defendant's motion was untimely); United States v. Bennett, 539 F.2d 45, 49-51 (10th
Cir. 1976); Sapienza v. Vincent, 534 F.2d 1007, 1010 (2d Cir. 1976).
18. United States v. Mosely, 810 F.2d 93, 98 (6th Cir. 1987).
19. This is similar to the way in which courts have deemed a defendant to have "for-
feited" his confrontation right. Forfeiture of the confrontation right is discussed infra Part
II.B.2.
20. See Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 339, 347 (1970) (holding that a trial judge may
terminate self-representation by a defendant who engages in obstructionist misconduct).
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judge's discretion.2' A judge can even rescind his order allowing
the defendant to represent himself where the defendant is unruly
and unresponsive to the judge's rulings.22 It follows that "disruptive
activities" would, and should, include using the right to represent
oneself in order to intimidate a witness. Such action would surely
be subject to substantive limitation, even of the pro se right.
Courts have recognized some acts by pro se defendants as akin
to traditional forfeiture of constitutional rights. Whenever a de-
fendant's deliberate dilatory or obstructive behavior threatens to
subvert the core concept of a trial or compromise the court's abil-
ity to conduct a fair trial, the defendant's self-representation rights
are subject to forfeiture. 4 The court's ability to conduct a fair trial
is obviously compromised where a defendant chooses to cross-
examine a witness himself in order to intimidate her into perjuring
herself or refusing to testify altogether. Although such forfeiture
would have to result from a case-by-case analysis, it is clear that the
self-representation right can be limited, especially where the de-
fendant's conduct as his own counsel can undermine the justice
system's truth-seeking goals. The analysis does not end there;
judges still must be able to ensure that a trial is not interrupted by
a defendant acting inappropriately in pursuit of his own defense.
Once the right to counsel is properly waived, trial courts are
permitted to appoint standby counsel to assist the otherwise pro se
defendant. 25 It is the defendant's prerogative to determine how his
case will be fashioned, but "[w] hen an accused waives the right to
assistance of counsel, he must also, of course, relinquish many of
21. People v. Dent, 65 P.3d 1286, 1290-91 (Cal. 2003); see also Allen, 397 U.S. at 350
("To allow the disruptive activities of a defendant ... to prevent his trial is to allow him to
profit from his own wrong.")
22. United States v. Brock, 159 F.3d 1077, 1080 (7th Cir. 1998) (judge's decision to
terminate defendant's self-representation was not an abuse of discretion where the defen-
dant made requests that were denied by the district judge and defendant expressed his
dissatisfaction with the judge's rulings and explanations by refusing to proceed, even after
several contempt citations); see also Clark v. Perez, 510 F.3d 382, 395 (2d Cir. 2008) (recog-
nizing that a court may deny the defendant the right to represent himself where the
defendant deliberately engages in obstructionist misconduct or is unwilling to abide by
courtroom protocol); Wood, 491 F.3d at 202 (the trial court may terminate the defendant's
right to self-representation where defendant fails to abide by courtroom rules and/or en-
gages in obstructionist conduct); United States v. Edelmann, 458 F.3d 791, 808-09 (8th Cir.
2006) (the defendant may not operate pro se in order to delay, disrupt, distort the system,
or manipulate the trial process); United States v. Frazier-El, 204 F.3d 553, 560 (4th Cir.
2000) ("The right [to represent oneself] does not exist ... to be used as a tactic for delay,
for disruption, for distortion of the system, or for manipulation of the trial process.") (in-
ternal citations omitted).
23. See infra note 29.
24. See supra note 21; see also infra notes 28-29.
25. McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 182 (1984); State v. Martin, 816 N.E.2d 227,
232 (Ohio 2004).
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the collateral benefits traditionally associated with representa-
tion., 26 Trial judges often decide to appoint standby counsel "when
they fear that a pro se defendant's disruptive conduct may force
termination of his self-representation.,
27
In Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, the Supreme Court held that due
process required criminal contempt proceedings be before a neu-
tral judge, someone "other than the one reviled by the
contemnor."2' The Court noted that the trial judge does have some
latitude, however, in dealing with outbursts from pro se defen-
dants: "Laymen, foolishly trying to defend themselves, may
understandably create awkward and embarrassing scenes. 2 9 Chief
Justice Burger concurred to emphasize why it aids the efficiency of
courtroom procedure to sometimes limit the self-representation
right by appointing standby counsel: "Certain aspects of the prob-
lem of maintaining in courtrooms the indispensable atmosphere of
quiet orderliness are crucial. Without order and quiet, the adver-
sary process must fail."
3 0
Although the proposal at hand is aimed at defendants who act to
intimidate the witnesses testifying against them, rather than just
creating awkward scenes, the logic in support of the conclusion is
the same. Since a judge can overrule the defendant's objections
and appoint standby counsel, "a categorical bar on participation by
standby counsel in the presence of the jury is unnecessary."'" Faretta
gives the defendant the right to proceed pro se; however, the "core
of the Faretta right" is the defendant's ability to shape the case he
presents. 32 Participation by counsel to steer the defendant through
basic procedures of trial is permissible even in the unlikely event
that it may undermine the pro se defendant's appearance of con-
trol over his own defense. The defendant can still have substantial
input into the case he presents to the jury even where his standby
counsel conducts a cross-examination. Where there are disagree-
ments between the counsel and the defendant, the disagreements
should be resolved in favor of the defendant wherever the matter is
one that would normally be left to counsel's discretion. 3
26. Note, The Jailed Pro Se Defendant and the Right to Prepare a Defense, 86 YALE L.J. 292,
294 (1976).
27. Id. at 313; see also Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455, 467-68 (1971); United
States v. Corrigan, 401 F. Supp. 795, 800 (D. Wyo. 1975); Commonwealth v. Africa, 353 A.2d
855, 864 (Pa. 1976).
28. Maybeny, 400 U.S. at 466 (citation omitted).
29. Id. at 462.
30. Id. at 466 (Burger,J., concurring).
31. McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 182 (1984).
32. Id. at 178.
33. Id. at 179.
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Most pro se defendants are appointed standby counsel, regard-
less of whether they have engaged in any acts of intimidation.
These representatives can effectively protect the defendant's con-
frontation right and cross-examine any witnesses unavailable to the
defendant. The standby counsel usually advises the defendant on
strategy and the law, with ultimate decisions on the case left to the
defendant. Here, where the witness may perjure herself when
confronted by her alleged attacker, the standby counsel would
temporarily take the reins of the case for the purposes of cross-
examination. Even though Faretta does not require hybrid repre-
sentation,34 this Note submits that the defendant can guide his
standby counsel in the subjects upon which to cross-examine the
witness while enjoying the rights the Sixth Amendment protects.
III. THE CONFRONTATION RIGHT
35
A. The Importance of the Confrontation Right
The concerns addressed by the Confrontation Clause have a
long history in the Anglo-American legal tradition.3 r The New Tes-
tament of the Bible quotes a man delivering a prisoner to the
Romans as saying: "It is not the manner of the Romans to deliver
any man to die, before that he which is accused have the accusers
face to face, and have license to answer for himself concerning the
crime laid against him. '37 The trial of Sir Walter Raleigh in the six-
teenth century also underscores the importance of confrontation.
During Raleigh's trial, he objected to the admission of another's
34. Hybrid representation is where standby counsel and the pro se defendant act as
true co-counsel and teammates. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE &JEROL) H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PRO-
CEDURE 556 (2d ed. 1992) (defining hybrid representation as when "defendant and counsel
act, in effect, as co-counsel, with each speaking for the defense during different phases of
the trial"); Lockhart v. State, 671 N.E.2d 893, 898 (Ind. App. 1996) (defining hybrid repre-
sentation as "the right to proceed pro se and to be represented by counsel at the time").
There is no federal constitutional right to hybrid representation, but hybrid representation
can be available to the defendant at the district court's discretion. See, e.g., United States v.
Einfeldt, 138 F.3d 373, 378 (8th Cir. 1998); United States v. Tutino, 883 F.2d 1125, 1141 (2d
Cir. 1989); United States v. LaChance, 817 F.2d 1491, 1498 (11th Cir. 1987); United States v.
Mosely, 810 F.2d 93, 97-98 (6th Cir. 1987); United States v. Halbert, 640 F.2d 1000, 1009
(9th Cir. 1981).
35. The author uses this term interchangeably with the "right to confront one's ac-
cuser." These terms all refer to the Sixth Amendment right, under the Confrontation
Clause, to confront adverse witnesses at trial.
36. For a discussion of the long history of the Confrontation Clause, through Roman
and early English and colonial times, see Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 43-50
(2004).
37. Acts 25:16 (KingJames); see also Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 496 n.25 (1959).
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confession where he had no opportunity to cross-examine the wit-
ness producing the confession: "But it is strange to see how you
press me still with [this witness], and yet will not produce him ....
[L] et him be produced, and if he will yet accuse me or avow this
Confession of his, it shall convict me and ease you of further
proof.,18 This time period "brings to mind pictures of trial by affi-
davit, condemnation by faceless witnesses, and proof of guilt by
mere recital of charges" 35-a situation the Confrontation Clause
was designed to prevent.
The Supreme Court "has been zealous to protect these rights [of
confrontation and cross-examination] from erosion. 40 In the last
few years, the Court has gone through a massive transformation in
ensuring that the right to confront one's accusers remains pro-
tected and retains its constitutional significance. 4' The Court's
holdings in Crawford v. Washington and in Davis v. Washington repre-
sent the renewed emphasis on the confrontation right and its
centrality to the trial process through a more originalist reading of
the Confrontation Clause.4' The right to confrontation need not
necessarily guarantee the defendant a chance for verbal combat
with his accuser; however, the right at least ensures that the defen-
•43
dant will not be tried by a secret court with unknown witnesses.
38. Trial of Sir Walter Raleigh, I CRIMINAL TRIALS 400, 427 (David Jardine ed.,
Charles Knight 1832), quoted in Nesson & Benkler, supra note 4, at 149.
39. Erwin N. Griswold, The Due Process Revolution and Confrontation, 119 U. PA. L. REv.
711,712 (1971).
40. Greene, 360 U.S. at 497.
41. In Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), the Supreme Court rejected the pre-
vious standard for admission of hearsay evidence ("adequate indicia of reliability") in favor
of a more originalist reading of the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause. Crawford held
that "[w]here testimonial evidence is at issue, however, the Sixth Amendment demands what
the common law required: unavailability [of the witness] and a prior opportunity for cross-
examination." Id. at 68. While the Crawford Court did not expressly define which statements
would be considered "testimonial," in 2006 the Court found that hearsay statements made
during the course of a 911 emergency call were not "testimonial" and therefore were admis-
sible against the defendant. See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 826-29 (2006).
42. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 50 ("It was these practices [of ex parte examinations] that the
Crown deployed in notorious treason cases like Raleigh's; that the Marian statutes invited;
that English law's assertion of a right to confrontation was meant to prohibit; and that the
founding-era rhetoric decried. The Sixth Amendment must be interpreted with this focus in
mind."); id. at 59 ("Our cases have thus remained faithful to the Framers' understanding:
Testimonial statements of witnesses absent from trial have been admitted only where the
declarant is unavailable, and only where the defendant has had a prior opportunity to cross-
examine."); id. at 61 ("Where testimonial statements are involved, we do not think the
Framers meant to leave the Sixth Amendment's protection to the vagaries of the rules of
evidence, much less to amorphous notions of 'reliability.' "); Davis, 547 U.S. at 824 (explain-
ing the definition of "testimony" in the context of "early American case[s] invoking the
Confrontation Clause common-law right to confrontation").
43. See Friedman & McCormack, supra note 7, at 1203; see also Kirby v. United States,
174 U.S. 47, 55 (1899) ("But a fact which can be primarily established only by witnesses
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Crawford and Davis each represent the Court's movement back
toward the originalist understanding of the confrontation right. To
understand the significance of these recent decisions, we must also
understand the historically-recognized interests guarded by the
confrontation right. As traditionally understood, the Sixth
Amendment protects the defendant's "interest in securing full and
fair opportunity to test the evidence."44 Crawford emphasized that
"the principal evil at which the Confrontation Clause was directed
was the civil-law mode of criminal procedure, and particularly its
use of ex parte examinations as evidence against the accused." 5 The
courts may be reluctant to impede upon the confrontation right as
it is considered "[o] ne of the fundamental guarantees of life and
liberty.
46
Despite such broad proclamations of the right's importance,
scholars and jurists alike have recognized that the exact "meaning
of the Confrontation Clause is an enigma."47 Despite the Court's
renewed emphasis on the Confrontation Right's importance in this
decade, several questions about the extent of the confrontation
right remain unanswered.48 While the confrontation right is essen-
tial to a fair trial, it "is by no means free from ambiguity, for the
words could be read as simply insuring to the accused the right to
be present when a witness is giving damaging testimony. 49 Al-
though these theories on the meaning of the Confrontation Clause
were written pre-Crawford, the fact remains that while recent Su-
preme Court jurisprudence has adopted an originalist reading of
cannot be proved against an accused ... except by witnesses who confront him at the trial,
upon whom he can look while being tried, whom he is entitled to cross-examine, and whose
testimony he may impeach in every mode authorized by the established rules governing the
trial or conduct of criminal cases."); Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 748 (1987) (Marshall,
J., dissenting) ("The text [of the Sixth Amendment] plainly envisions that witnesses against
the accused shall, as a rule, testify in his presence.").
44. Nesson & Benkler, supra note 4, at 163.
45. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 50.
46. Kirby, 174 U.S. at 55.
47. Richard D. Friedman, Confrontation and the Definition of Chutzpa, 31 ISR. L. Rv. 506,
509 (1997); see infra notes 49, 77.
48. These questions may include: What statements are testimonial? Does the Confron-
tation Clause forbid the use of state lab reports? As of this writing, the Supreme Court is
currently examining how the Confrontation Clause impacts the use of state lab reports in
criminal trials. Massachusetts v. Melendez-Diaz, 80 N.E.2d 676 (Mass. App. Ct. 2007), cert.
granted, 128 S.Ct. 1647 (U.S. Mar. 17, 2008) (No. 07-591).
49. James w. Jennings, Note, Preserving the Right to Confrontation-A New Approach to
Hearsay Evidence in Criminal Trials, 113 U. PA. L. REv. 741, 742 (1965); see also Snyder v. Mas-
sachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 107 (1934) (discussing "the privilege of presence" at one's own
trial); Dowdell v. United States, 221 U.S. 325, 330 (1911) (comparing a Philippine statute to
the American guarantee of witnesses "who give their testimony in [the accused's] pres-
ence"); Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242 (1895) (emphasizing that adverse
witnesses should testify in defendant's andjury's presence).
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the text of the Sixth Amendment, the Court has not yet fully ex-
plored the contours of the confrontation right. There are certain
conditions, though, that most accept as requisite under the Con-
frontation Clause. These include the defendant's presence during
all witness testimony being given in open court, subject to cross-
.• 50
examination.
However ambiguous the boundaries of the Confrontation
Clause may be, enforcement of the right involves at least two main
concerns: cross-examination and accurate fact-finding. The con-
frontation right as a whole is composed of several factors,
including a prohibition against secret hearings and nameless wit-
nesses.5' These protections are most often enforced through
vigorous cross-examination. This cross-examination is the "func-
tional purpose" of the Confrontation Clause. 2 In fact, "a major
reason underlying the constitutional confrontation rule is to give a
defendant charged with a crime an opportunity to cross-examine
the witnesses against him."'', Wigmore's classic treatise on evidence
notes that "[t] he main and essential purpose of confrontation is to
secure the opportunity of cross-examination. , 4 Modern scholars of
this subject agree that thorough cross-examination is the crux of
the confrontation right.55 Further, Justice Scalia has noted that the
confrontation right "has long been read as securing an adequate
opportunity to cross-examine adverse witnesses."
56
The text of the Sixth Amendment does not specifically address
the requirements of sufficient cross-examination. Cross-
examination that meets the constitutional requirements of con-
frontation, however, typically consists of a witness "placed on the
stand, under oath, and respond[ing] willingly to questions."57 The
Court has expanded on this bare bones definition, recognizing
50. See Richard D. Friedman, The Conundrum of Children, Confrontation, and Hearsay, 65
LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 243, 247 (2002).
51. See, e.g., Beard v. Stahr, 370 U.S. 41, 43 (1962).
52. Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 739 (1987).
53. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 406-07 (1965).
54. 5 Wigmore, Evidence § 1395. (Chadbourn rev. 1974)
55. Kenneth H. Hanson, Waiver of Constitutional Right of Confrontation, 39J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 55 (1948) ("If the opportunity for cross-examination has once been given, the
right of confrontation has been satisfied"); Nesson & Benkler, supra note 4, at 173 ("In the
absence of cross-examination, our confrontation is incomplete ... ."); Jennings, supra note
47, at 745 ("If any federal standard can profitably be distilled .... that standard would be
that the right to confrontation gives a criminal defendant the opportunity to face and effec-
tively cross-examine the witnesses who are testifying against him.").
56. United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554, 558 (1988). But see Maryland v. Craig, 497
U.S. 836, 861 (1990) (ScaliaJ., dissenting) ("[N]one of the many policy interests from time
to time pursued by statutory law could overcome a defendant's right to face his or her ac-
cusers in court.").
57. Owens, 484 U.S. at 561.
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that the cross-examination of adverse witnesses is crucial to main-
taining the fundamental fairness of the criminal justice system 58
The Court has further stated that "a primary interest secured by
[the Confrontation Clause] is the right of cross-examination. " 59
While cross-examination is not the only requirement of the con-
frontation right, it is the practice through which the right is most
consistently enforced and protected. Judge-issued orders and rules
of procedure that infringe upon the defendant's ability to cross-
examine the witnesses against him are most suspect and vulnerable
to challenge.
While cross-examination is the means through which the con-
frontation right is most often satisfied, there may be an additional
underlying purpose in guaranteeing thorough cross-examination:
accurate fact-finding in the trial process.0 This truth-seeking pur-
pose is often linked to the cross-examination requirement.61 In fact,
cross-examination is considered "the principal means by which the
believability of a witness and the truth of his testimony are tested.,
62
Without cross-examination of the state's witnesses, the jury hears
only the state's theory of the facts, a practice that would be unfairly
prejudicial to the defendant. Therefore, "all testimonial evidence
must be produced through live witnesses who are subject to cross-
examination as to the truth of their testimony."63 Without this cross-
examination, the facts presented to the jury would only be testimony
in favor of the prosecution, sealed with the stamp of government
approval. The confrontation right aims to avoid such a one-sided
trial: "[T]he mission of the Confrontation Clause is to advance a
practical concern for the accuracy of the truth-determining process
in criminal trials. 64
This is not to say that the Confrontation Clause requires indicia
of reliability in the testimony against the defendant, which was a
requirement that Crawford v. Washington expressly overruled.6"
58. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 818 (1975) ("The rights to notice, confrontation,
and compulsory process, when taken together, guarantee that a criminal charge may be an-
swered in a manner now considered fundamental to the fair administration of American
justice-through the calling and interrogation of favorable witnesses, the cross-examination of
adverse witnesses, and the orderly introduction of evidence.").
59. Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415,418 (1965); see also Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S.
730, 736 (1987).
60. Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 182 (1987).
61. Stincer, 482 U.S. at 736 ("[C]ross-examination is the '"greatest legal engine ever in-
vented for the discovery of truth."'" (citing California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970)
(quoting 5J. Wigmore, Evidence § 1367))).
62. Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316 (1974).
63. Griswold, supra note 39, at 717.
64. Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 89 (1970).
65. 541 U.S. at 68-69, overruling Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
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However, the Confrontation Clause does require truth-seeking by
means of effective cross-examination, since this can have a "signifi-
cant effect on the integrity of the fact-finding process."c  While
Crawford rejects the idea of limiting the confrontation right in the
face of reliable testimony, it still recognizes the importance of the
confrontation right in eliciting a factually complete record at trial:
[The Confrontation Clause] commands, not that evidence be
reliable, but that reliability be assessed in a particular manner:
by testing in the crucible of cross-examination. The Clause
thus reflects a judgment, not only about the desirability of re-
liable evidence (a point on which there could be little
dissent), but about how reliability can best be determined
This Note sets forth a proposal that maintains the dual require-
ments of the confrontation right: cross-examination and
developing a thorough record of facts at trial.68
B. Constitutional Limitations Upon the Confrontation Right
Although the right to confront one's accusers is fundamental, it
is not absolute. Courts have limited the scope of the defendant's
protections under the Confrontation Clause. The confrontation
right is considered a trial right,69 so practically, "[f] ace-to-face con-
frontation is not always possible or necessary.
7
1
The Sixth Amendment proscribes the "denial of significant
diminution" of the confrontation right, but "may, in appropriate
cases, bow to accommodate other legitimate interests in the crimi-
nal trial process.,
7
1
A court typically cannot exclude a defendant from his own trial
because his mere presence intimidates a testifying witness or vic-
tim. It should still be noted that there are some restrictions on
cross-examination, untouched by Crawford, which "reflect a belief
that the proposed cross-examination will impede the search for
66. Berger v. California, 393 U.S. 314, 315 (1969) (internal citations omitted); see also
Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 736 (1987) ("The opportunity for cross-examination,
protected by the Confrontation Clause, is critical for ensuring the integrity of the fact-
finding process.").
67. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61.
68. See infra Part III for a discussion of how a judge could limit the pro se and con-
frontation rights but still preserve the essence of the Sixth Amendment protections.
69. Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 52 (1987).
70. Nesson & Benkler, supra note 4, at 169.
71. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295 (1973) (internal citations omitted).
[VOL. 42:3
SPRING 2009] "An Opportunity for Effective Cross-Examination" 731
truth."72 The primary reasons for limiting the confrontation right
can be distilled into two categories: (1) the susceptibility of the tes-
tifying witness (typically a child or other vulnerable person) and
(2) the defendant forfeiting the right by his own conduct.
73
1. Child Victims and Other Susceptible Witnesses
Limitations on the confrontation right sometimes involve child
victims or witnesses. As discussed herein, courts have expressed the
concern that such vulnerable witnesses may testify untruthfully or
not testify at all if the defendant enjoys the full protections of the
Confrontation Clause. Several courts have upheld practices that
would likely violate a literal reading of the Confrontation Clause,
including permitting the child to testify via close-circuit television
7 4
and allowing a child witness to testify in the courtroom but outside
of the defendant's line of sight.75 These decisions hearken back to
the Supreme Court's edict that "[t]he right to cross-examination,
protected by the Confrontation Clause, thus is essentially a 'func-
tional' right designed to promote reliability in the truth-finding
functions of a criminal trial."76 The substantial weight of legal au-
thority dictates, then, that a court could infringe upon the
confrontation right in order to ensure unperjured testimony from
a sensitive victim.
72. James B. Haddad, The Future of Confrontation Clause Developments: What Will Emerge
When the Supreme Court Synthesizes the Diverse Lines of Confrontation Decisions?, 81 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 77,87 (1990).
73. This Note's proposal reflects a combination of these two established justifications
for limiting the confrontation right: where the defendant acts to intimidate a vulnerable
witness, he forforeits his pro se right and limits his confrontation right.
74. See, e.g., Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 851-52 (1990); Danner v. Motley, 448
F.3d 372, 378-80 (6th Cir. 2006) (holding that the trial court was entitled to rely on state's
interest in eliciting truthful testimony from a 15-year-old victim allowed to testify via closed
circuit television); United States v. Giordano, 172 F. App'x 340, 343 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding
expert testimony not required in order for the district court to find that a child victim could
not testify in person due to fear); Fuster-Escalona v. Fla. Dept. of Corr., 170 F. App'x 627,
629 (11th Cir. 2006) (allowing four children to testify via two-way closed television at defen-
dant's trial for sexual battery where the witnesses could see the defendant on a monitor in
judge's chambers and witnesses were contemporaneously cross-examined by defense attor-
ney); Marx v. State, 987 S.W.2d 577, 580-81 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (affirming the
allowance of child victims to testify via two-way closed circuit television where district court
explicitly found said procedure would protect victims from further trauma).
75. See, e.g., United States v. Etimani, 328 F.3d 493, 500-01 (9th Cir. 2003) (placement
behind victim of television monitor showing defendant, rather than in her direct field of
vision as she testified, did not violate Confrontation Clause); Lucas v. McBride, 505
F.Supp.2d 329, 353 (N.D. W. Va. 2007) (defendant's confrontation rights were not violated
where a child victim was positioned so that she did not have to look directly at defendant);
Smith v. State, 8 S.W.3d 534, 537 (Ark. 2000).
76. Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 737 (1987).
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The limitations on a defendant's strict constitutional right to
confront his accusers are most often justified by the court's desire
to ensure truthful and unencumbered testimony. For example,
there may be psychological reasons that a vulnerable witness would
lie on the stand when directly confronted by the defendant. The
amicus brief submitted by the American Psychological Association
in support of the result ultimately reached in Maryland v. Craig
said just that: "Requiring child witnesses to undergo face-to-face
confrontation, therefore, may in some cases actually disserve the
truth-seeking rationale that underlies the Confrontation
Clause."" Justice O'Connor mirrored this language in her Craig
opinion, which allowed a child witness to testify by means of
closed-circuit television: "Indeed, where face-to-face confronta-
tion causes significant emotional distress in a child witness, there is
evidence that such confrontation would in fact disserve the Con-
frontation Clause's truth seeking goal."7" In Craig, the thought was
that the defendant's presence before a susceptible child witness
was intimidating and impeded the child's ability to testify truth-
fully.
It should be noted that witness vulnerability is not a blank check
to allow excessive limitations on the confrontation right. There
must be some form of confrontation. Although removing the wit-
ness through closed-circuit television may be allowable under
certain circumstances, some state courts have held that the use of
one-way glass during an adult victim's testimony violated the de-
fendant's Sixth Amendment rights.79 However, using one-way glass
with an adult victim can be unconstitutional not because the wit-
ness was removed from the defendant's line of sight, but because
of a due process problem. 80 The trial court should not allow the use
of one-way glass without holding an evidentiary hearing on
whether, and to what degree, the witness was intimidated by the
defendant. By holding such a hearing or investigation pre-trial, any
due process concerns regarding the limits on the defendant's Sixth
Amendment rights are relieved.
Although Craig and its ilk have been criticized by some authors
as imposing unconstitutional limitations upon the Sixth Amend-
ment, the important (and still lawful) point is that there may be
some essence of fact-finding lost when a vulnerable victim is faced
with his attacker. This is especially so when the defendant's affirma-
77. Gail S. Goodman et al., Child Witnesses and the Confrontation Clause: The American
Psychological Association Brief in Maryland v. Craig, 15 LAw & Hum. BEHAV. 13, 14 n.6 (1991).
78. Craig, 497 U.S. at 857.
79. See, e.g., People v. Murphy, 132 Cal. Rptr. 2d 688 (Cal. App. 2003).
80. Id. at 694.
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tive act-that is, conducting the cross-examination-causes the
witness to be so intimidated as to be unable to testify.8 The solu-
tion proposed here avoids Craigs pitfalls in that the confrontation
right here is still nearly entirely preserved; the only limitation
comes in the way the courts protect a vulnerable victim or witness
from being intimidated into perjury by his attacker. The defen-
dant's standby counsel can still ensure that the testimony favorable
to the defendant's case is elicited on cross-examination. The
strengths of the confrontation right are upheld at only the expense
of the right to conduct one's own defense. This is discussed further
in the next section.
When a criminal case arises involving a child witness to a sensi-
tive or violent crime, the court often conducts an in camera
examination of the witness or a hearing to determine whether her
ability to testify truthfully (or to testify at all) would be negatively
82
affected by the defendant's presence. Usually, there must be a
case-specific finding that a child witness would suffer greater than
de minimis trauma with more than a simple reluctance to testify
stemming not from the general stresses of the courtroom but from
the involvement of the defendant.
83
In many states, once a prosecutor proves by a preponderance of
the evidence that a child witness would be unlawfully intimidated
by the defendant's presence, the court may limit the defendant's
confrontation right s4 Typically, though, courts have been quite
81. See Friedman, supra note 50, at 247 n.20. This involves the concept of forfeiture,
discussed infra Part II.B.2.
82. See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-67.9 (2003) (requiring an attorney to apply for an order,
pre-trial, to determine whether a child witness testifying by closed-circuit television would
aid in the search for truth and serve the interests ofjustice). But see United States v. Turning
Bear, 357 F.3d 730, 736-37 (8th Cir. 2004) (use of closed-circuit television violated confron-
tation right where child's fear was from a combination of factors, and not just the
defendant).
83. Lomholt v. Iowa, 327 F.3d 748, 752 (8th Cir. 2003) (citing Craig, 497 U.S. at 855-
56 (1990).
84. The constitutional rule regarding treatment of child witnesses, of course, is a na-
tional standard to which states may choose to adhere. E.g., FLA. STAT. § 92.53(1) (stating
that after a finding that there is a substantial likelihood that a victim or witness under the
age of 16 would suffer "at least moderate emotional or mental harm due to the presence of
the defendant," the witness is unavailable and may testify via videotape); NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 29-1926(1) (a) (2008) ("Upon request of the prosecuting or defense attorney and upon a
showing of compelling need, the court shall order the taking of a videotape deposition of a
child victim of or child witness to any offense punishable as a felony."); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 18.2-67.9 (2003) (allowing a child to testify by closed-circuit television if the trial judge
finds that the child is unavailable because of: (1) the child's persistent refusal to testify de-
spite judicial requests to do so; (2) the child's substantial inability to communicate about the
offense; and/or (3) the substantial likelihood, based upon expert opinion testimony, that
the child will suffer severe emotional trauma from so testifying).
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friendly to the cause of the defendants in their treatment of the
confrontation right.
2. Forfeiture
While courts have protected vulnerable witnesses by restricting
the defendant's confrontation right in appropriate circumstances,
courts have also limited the confrontation right where the defen-
dant has acted inappropriately. This restriction, known as the
doctrine of forfeiture, occurs when the defendant has intimidated,
harmed, or somehow prevented a witness from giving testimony.
Affirmative misconduct by the defendant leads to him "forfeiting"
otherwise-guaranteed rights. Here, the defendant may have for-
feited his right to proceed pro se and to conduct his own cross-
examination where his aggressive tactics or purpose in appearing
pro se results in a witness too intimidated to testify truthfully or at
all.85
The doctrine of forfeiture ensures that the confrontation right
will not be substantially affected in the absence of some "bad act"
on the part of the defendant. 6 Indeed, "[1] ike almost any right...
the confrontation right should be considered subject to forfeiture
by misconduct: If wrongdoing of the accused accounts for the un-
availability of the witness, then the accused cannot complain that
his confrontation right renders improper use of a statement made
by the witness." '' 7 In order to infringe upon a criminal defendant's
confrontation right under the present proposal, there must be
more than just a nervous witness, there must be evidence of coer-
cion. An examination of the courts' treatment of the doctrine of
forfeiture illuminates the proper use of this doctrine against some
pro se defendants.
Justice Cardozo noted the impact of the forfeiture doctrine on
the defendant's trial rights in Snyder v. Massachusetts when he wrote
that: "No doubt the privilege [of confronting witnesses] may be
lost by consent or at times even by misconduct."8 8 The Supreme
85. The defendant's mere presence is not likely sufficient to warrant forfeiture or limi-
tation of his confrontation right. See supra Part III.B.
86. I propose that a pro se defendant's right to conduct his own case not be limited
unless there is both a vulnerable witness and coercive action (or perceived coercive action)
from the defendant.
87. Friedman, supra note 50, at 248 (citation omitted).
88. 291 U.S. 97, 106 (1934).
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Court has accepted this as recently as Crawford v. Washington 9 and
Davis v. Washington,9° and it has been echoed by many of the lower
appellate courts.9' In Illinois v. Allen, the Supreme Court allowed
the removal of a defendant from the courtroom during witness tes-
timony when the defendant refused to remain silent:
[W] e explicitly hold today that a defendant can lose his right
to be present at trial if, after he has been warned by the judge
that he will be removed if he continues his disruptive behav-
ior, he nevertheless insists on conducting himself in a manner
so disorderly, disruptive, and disrespectful of the court that
his trial cannot be carried on with him in the courtroom.9 2
Allen shows the Court's belief that the defendant's behavior dur-
ing trial can result in his confrontation right being limited by the
judge, especially where the defendant is disruptive to court pro-
ceedings. Although Allen dealt with a boisterous and disruptive
defendant, the same logic used by the Court could be readily ap-
plied to the matter at hand:
But our courts, palladiums of liberty as they are, cannot be
treated disrespectfully with impunity. Nor can the accused be
permitted by his disruptive conduct indefinitely to avoid be-
ing tried on the charges brought against him. It would
degrade our country and our judicial system to permit our
courts to be bullied, insulted, and humiliated and their
89. 541 U.S. 36, 62 (2004) ("For example, the rule of forfeiture by wrongdoing (which
we accept) extinguishes confrontation claims on essentially equitable grounds; it does not
purport to be an alternative means of determining reliability.").
90. 547 U.S. 813, 833 (2006) ("But when defendants seek to undermine the judicial
process by procuring or coercing silence from witnesses and victims, the Sixth Amendment
does not require courts to acquiesce. While defendants have no duty to assist the State in
proving their guilt, they do have the duty to refrain from acting in ways that destroy the in-
tegrity of the criminal-trial system .... [O]ne who obtains the absence of a witness by
wrongdoing forfeits the constitutional right to confrontation.").
91. See, e.g., United States v. Cherry, 217 F.3d 811,820 (10th Cir. 2000) (a criminal de-
fendant may have waived his confrontation rights and hearsay objections if a preponderance
of the evidence shows that the defendant directly made or conspired to make the witness
unavailable or if the wrongful procurement was in furtherance of an ongoing conspiracy);
United States v. Emery, 186 F.3d 921, 926-27 (8th Cir. 1999) (defendant in a prosecution
for killing a federal informant forfeited hearsay and confrontation objections to admission
of statements by victim by wrongfully procuring victim's absence); United States v. Dhinsa,
243 F.3d 635, 651-52 (2d Cir. 2001) (right of confrontation and hearsay objection waived
where the defendant has wrongfully procured the witnesses' silence through threats, actual
violence or murder).
92. 397 U.S. 337, 343 (1970).
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orderly progress thwarted and obstructed by defendants
brought before them charged with crimes.
The Court would not tolerate the disrespect to the judicial system
inherent in the behavior of any pro se defendant who uses his posi-
tion to intimidate adverse witnesses.
Even though "one of the defendant's primary advantages of be-
ing present at the trial, his ability to communicate with his counsel,
is greatly reduced when the defendant is in a condition of total
physical restraint," the Allen Court would still permit such a restric-
tion when the defendant's obstructive actions warranted it.94 Trial
judges have great latitude under Allen to decide how to restrain the
defendant, even allowing such restrictive measures as bind-and-
gagging the defendant, contempt citations, and removal from the
courtroom.95 Lower courts have echoed this principle: "Courts of
justice are universally acknowledged to be vested, by their very
creation, with power to impose silence, respect, and decorum, in
their presence, and submission to their lawful mandates."96 Justice
Brennan even wrote separately in Allen to emphasize the judicial
disdain for allowing a defendant to profit from his own wrongs in
the courtroom: "The Constitution would protect none of us if it
prevented the courts from acting to preserve the very processes
that the Constitution itself prescribes.
9 7
The Supreme Court most recently considered the forfeiture
doctrine in its 2007-2008 term. In Giles v. California, the Court held
that a criminal defendant only forfeits his confrontation right
where he intended the result of his actions to prevent an adverse
witness from testifying against him.98 The Court recognized the old
English roots of the forfeiture exception to the confrontation rule,
where at common law, a court could "permit[] the introduction of
statements of a witness who was 'detained' or 'kept away' by the
,means or procurement' of the defendant."99 Relying on this excep-
tion as it existed at English common law, the Court found that
forfeiture is only available where the defendant procured the ab-
93. Id. at 346.
94. Id. at 344.
95. Id. at 343-44, 347 ("The flagrant disregard in the courtroom of elementary stan-
dards of proper conduct should not and cannot be tolerated. We believe trial judges
confronted with disruptive, contumacious, stubbornly defiant defendants must be given
sufficient discretion to meet the circumstances of each case.").
96. Armstrong v. Guccione, 470 F.3d 89, 103 (2d Cir. 2006) (citing Chambers v.
NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43 (1991)).
97. Allen, 397 U.S. at 350.
98. No. 07-6053, slip op. at 7 (U.S.June 25, 2008).
99. Id. at 4.
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sence of the accusing witness on purpose, or with the intent to pre-
vent the witness from testifying. The Court did not illuminate how
the lower courts should determine the defendant's intent in pro-
curing the witness's absence. It is unclear how the Giles decision
will play out in practice.
In the case of our pro se defendant, Giles may not make a sig-
nificant impact. Regardless of what standard lower courts adopt in
order to determine whether a criminal defendant intended to pre-
vent a witness from taking the stand, our pro se defendant might
not have his right to represent himself limited if he had no intent
to intimidate a witness. It is clear that the courts would require in-
tent on the part of the defendant for forfeiture of the
confrontation right, but it is unknown whether courts would re-
quire intent to limit the pro se right. While the difference in the
application of the pro se and confrontation rights is subtle, it is
unclear how the courts would handle this issue.
Further, Giles deals largely with situations where a criminal de-
fendant kills the person who may testify against him. Giles,
therefore, is not applicable to this Note's focus, because in a mur-
der case, a defendant could not use cross-examination to
intimidate or terrorize a (deceased) victim.
The forfeiture principle can also be found in the Federal Rules
of Evidence and Criminal Procedure. Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 43(c) (1) (c) states that a defendant forfeits "the right to
be present [at his trial or sentencing] under the following circum-
stances: (c) when the court warns the defendant that it will remove
the defendant from the courtroom for disruptive behavior, but the
defendant persists in conduct that justifies removal from the court-
room."'00 Similarly, Rule 804 of the Federal Rules of Evidence
makes hearsay admissible if it is "[a] statement offered against a
party that has engaged or acquiesced in wrongdoing that was in-
tended to, and did, procure the unavailability of the declarant as a
witness."'  Rule 804 most likely applies even when the witness is
also the victim: "Nothing in the language of Rule 804(b) (6) sug-
gests that it is rendered inapplicable if the declarant is the victim of
the crime."0 2 These rules reflect the theory underlying the forfei-
ture doctrine, namely, that the defendant should neither profit
from his wrongs nor be able to complain about the loss of certain
rights when it is his own behavior that has resulted in that loss. 103
100. FED. R. CRIM. P. 43(c)(1)(C), quoted in Allen, 397 U.S. at 343 n.2.
101. FED. R. EVID. 804(b) (6).
102. Friedman, supra note 50, at 252 n.36.
103. See Friedman, supra note 47, at 506.
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Where the defendant's decision to act as his own counsel results in
a witness's intimidation, he may have forfeited his rights to pro-
ceed pro se and to personally confront adverse witnesses.
It is well-established that the confrontation right in particular is
one that can be forfeited by the defendant's wrongful conduct:
"The authorities are practically uniform on the proposition that
this right of confrontation is a personal privilege which the accused
can waive. The waiver may be either by express consent ... or by
conduct inconsistent with a purpose to insist on it."'' 0 4 The Supreme
Court adopted this theory in Davis: "[O]ne who obtains the ab-
sence of a witness by wrongdoing forfeits the constitutional right to
confrontation."'0'5
III. THE REFORM PROPOSAL
A. Judges Should Appoint Stand-By Counsel to Cross-Examine a
Susceptible Alleged Victim of a Pro Se Defendant
Because the Supreme Court has already limited the scope of the
confrontation and pro se rights in certain instances, a trial judge
faced with the problem of a witness intimidated into silence or per-
jury by an overzealous pro se defendant should similarly limit these
rights. The theory in this Note is that when a defendant acts pro se
to effect such harm to the witness, the trial court may constitution-
ally limit the defendant's right to conduct his own representation
and to confront his accusers. In such an event, standby counsel
should conduct the examination.
I propose a remedy for the adult witness who may be intimi-
dated by the defendant's cross-examination that is similar to that
adopted by judges post-Craig for child witnesses. Pre-trial, a judge
could interview a vulnerable witness in camera to determine
104. Recent Important Decisions, Criminal Law: Waiver of Confrontation, 19 MICH. L.
REV. 432, 439 (1921) (citations omitted). However, it should be noted that forfeiture is not
really a waiver of the confrontation or any other constitutional right, although some use the
terms "waiver" and "forfeiture" interchangeably. For the purposes of this Note, I will refer to
this concept exclusively as "forfeiture." For more on this distinction, see Friedman, supra
note 47, at 506 n.2 ("Some courts speak of the defendant as having waived the confrontation
right, but this is inaccurate: It is not necessarily so that an accused who has acted in the ways
described here has knowingly, intelligently, and deliberately relinquished the right."). See
also id. (forfeiture cannot be waiver, as it is hardly done knowingly and intelligently); WAYNE
R. LAFAVE &JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 546 (2d ed. 1992) ("Although com-
monly described as involving waivers, cases in which defendants have been forced to
proceed pro se because they failed to obtain counsel prior to trial are more appropriately
characterized as forfeiture cases.").
105. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 833 (2006).
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whether clear and convincing evidence indicates that the witness
might perjure herself or refuse to testify under the cross-
examination of the defendant. Such a finding would allow the
judge to appoint standby counsel to perform the cross-examination
of the vulnerable witness. Although this situation would most likely
arise when dealing with witnesses to or victims of violent crimes,
courts could evaluate the witnesses on a case-by-case basis.
Courts would probably disfavor a low-threshold standard for the
removal of defendant as arbiter of his own case. Therefore, I pro-
pose that once the state has shown by clear and convincing
evidence, pre-trial, that the defendant's cross-examination of a wit-
ness would leave that witness so shaken that she would likely
commit perjury or refuse to testify, then a court could command
the defendant relinquish his pro se right and allow standby counsel
to examine the sensitive witness. As in the child witness cases, here
there need not be any specific bad intent on the part of the defen-
dant to intimidate the witness.10 6 The judge would look at both the
impact of the defendant's appearance as his own counsel on the
witness's ability to testify truthfully as well as whether the witness's
feelings of intimidation were reasonable grounds for limiting the
defendant's rights.
While this proposal involves a pre-trial motion regarding a wit-
ness's susceptibility, the presiding trial judge still has authority to
insist upon a certain level of decorum at trial. Even if the prosecu-
tor fails to make a pre-trial showing that a defendant would
unlawfully intimidate a witness, the judge could interrupt the de-
fendant's pro se cross-examination if the defendant were behaving
improperly."°7
Procedurally, the trial judge could instruct the jury that the rea-
son for the substitution of standby counsel on cross-examination is
immaterial. Just as the judge would instruct that anything the pro
se defendant says as his own counsel is not evidence, the judge
could similarly tell the jury about the role of standby counsel. "The
assumption thatjurors are able to follow a trial judge's instructions
fully applies when rights guaranteed by the Confrontation Clause
are at issue."'0 s The issue is moot once the judge has given ade-
quate instructions to the jury.
106. Although it should be noted that if it could be established that the defendant were
acting as his own counsel for the very purpose of intimidating the witnesses against him,
then he clearly would be subject to censure, as witness intimidation is against the law.
107. See infra Part I.B for a discussion of appropriate limitations on the pro se right
passed down during trial.
108. Tennessee v. Street, 471 U.S. 409, 415 n.6 (1985) (citing Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S.
731, 735 (1969)).
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This Note's thesis is only valid, however, if a trial judge could
lawfully limit a defendant's right to proceed pro se in a way that
also lawfully limits his right to a face-to-face confrontation with the
witnesses against him. The issue may be framed thusly: while this
proposal restricts the pro se right, do such restrictions exceed the
constitutional limits of the Confrontation Clause?
B. Limiting the Right to Self-Representation Does Not Unconstitutionally
Violate the Confrontation Right
Using standby counsel to cross-examine an intimi-
dated/susceptible victim or witness is consistent with Sixth
Amendment jurisprudence. Specifically, this proposal safeguards
the confrontation right's core values while still fulfilling its truth-
seeking goals. Moreover, the confrontation right is preserved be-
cause the defendant still has the opportunity to hear the evidence
and participate in his defense, even though he himself is not the
conducting cross-examination. Finally, the proposal is consistent
with the theory of forfeiture under the Sixth Amendment.
1. Truth and Integrity in the Trial Process
Preventing a pro se defendant from personally cross-examining
sensitive witnesses against him is consistent with Sixth Amendment
jurisprudence that emphasizes truth-seeking and integrity in the
trial process. Any limits upon the defendant's direction of his own
case should be related to the susceptibility of the witness or the
sensitive nature of the offense. Practically speaking, the witness
testifying would likely have to be the victim of an invasive or vio-
lent crime, or witness to the same. There must be clear and
convincing evidence that being cross-examined directly by the
defendant, instead of by his standby counsel, would likely result
in the witness being intimidated into either refusing to testify or
testifying falsely. Restricting the defendant's cross-examination is
related to the general concern that a pro se defendant should not
circumvent the "truth-seeking" or "fact-finding" processes. In
general, "trials are attempts to determine the truth from an aggre-
gation of evidence, some of which may be very unreliable."1 9 This
proposal recognizes that while standby counsel and the defendant
may act to exclude inadmissible evidence, the truth is better sought
109. Friedman, supra note 50, at 245-46.
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from witnesses who are not bullied into perjuring themselves or
refusing to testify due to direct contact with the defendant.
Trial judges typically have a great deal of discretion when limit-
ing a defendant's confrontation right. Unless the limits on the
confrontation and self-representation rights rise to the level of a
constitutional violation, the court can typically use its judgment to
protect witnesses and "the decorum and respect inherent in the
concept of courts and judicial proceedings."11 The Supreme Court
held that in order to physically restrain the defendant and under-
mine his appearance before the jury, the trial court must
determine that such restraints are justified by a state interest spe-
cific to a particular trial."' Accordingly, if the trial judge finds
specifically that the state's interest in protecting witnesses from co-
ercion is legitimate and directly related to the defendant's
appearance as his own counsel, the judge would not violate the
Sixth Amendment in allowing the jury to see standby counsel exe-
cute the cross-examination.
Though courts may be loathe to balance the rights of the ad-
verse witness against the rights of the defendant, here the state
interest is quite substantial: preserving the integrity of the trial
process and encouraging witnesses to be truthful and candid. Even
when the court is swayed in favor of these all-important state inter-
ests, the defendant does not lose the core protections of the Sixth
Amendment. The fact remains that courts permit limits on both
Sixth Amendment rights discussed here: a defendant can be lim-
ited in proceeding pro se and can be limited in his confrontation
right. Neither right is absolute.
2. The Opportunity for Confrontation is Preserved
The limitations proposed here would remove neither the defen-
dant from his trial nor the witness from the target of her testimony.
Because the confrontation right emphasizes the importance of the
"presence" of the defendant to hear the evidence presented
against him,"2 and because, in practice, the confrontation right is
typically enforced through the defendant's counsel,"13 the defen-
dant's confrontation right would not be unlawfully infringed should
standby counsel be appointed to save witnesses from intimidation.
110. Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 343 (1970).
111. Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, 635 (2005) (finding a due process violation where
defendant was shackled at trial without requisite adequate justification).
112. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105-06 (1934).
113. See supra Part II.B.
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Even face-to-face confrontation of non-coerced witnesses is pre-
served by this proposal.
4
Lower courts have previously held that a defendant can be ex-
cluded from sidebar conferences with the defense counsel and
prosecutors without being deprived of his right to be present at
trial."'5 It follows, then, that his rights are preserved when he is pre-
sent to observe cross-examination, even if he is not conducting the
cross-examination himself. The solution proposed would not even
go as far as to remove the defendant from a sidebar conference;
here, it would just change the person who does the actual con-
fronting in preserving the confrontation right.
Changing the person who does the confronting is a familiar and
constitutionally permissible concept that is used in the cross-
examination of child victims."6 Courts and scholars have noted that
"[t]he particular need for using protective devices with child wit-
nesses stems from the fact that child victims are inherently
different from adult victims."".7 The use of protective devices in
criminal trials for witnesses and victims, however, should not be
limited to child witnesses and child victims. An adult victim of a
crime of a sensitive, invasive, or violent nature may be just as psy-
chologically compromised as a child witness. Regardless of the
victim's or witness's age, the desire to elicit truthful-and compre-
hensively cross-examined-testimony remains. Accordingly, the
limitation proposed by this Note-allowing a defendant to exercise
his confrontation right against vulnerable adult witnesses through
his standby counsel instead of through pro se representation-
does not run afoul of the Constitution. Standby counsel, usually an
attorney appointed by the trial judge to aid the pro se defendant in
matters of procedure and law, effectively preserves the defendant's
opportunity for effective cross-examination.
There is nothing to suggest, then, that the court could not limit
the right of self-representation in order to preserve both the fact-
finding process at trial and the confrontation right. If one consid-
ers "the text of the Confrontation Clause and of the whole of the
Sixth Amendment seriously, then, it appears that the Clause sets
forth a simple categorical rule that an accused has a right-subject
114. Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1016 (1988) ("We have never doubted, therefore, that
the Confrontation Clause guarantees the defendant a face-to-face meeting with witnesses
appearing before the trier of fact.") (citation omitted).
115. People v. Ochoa, 28 P.3d 78, 95-97 (Cal. 2001).
116. See supra Part Il.B.1.
117. Rachel I. Wollitzer, Sixth Amendment: Defendant's Right to Confront Witnesses: Constitu-
tionality of Protective Measures in Child Sexual Assault Cases, 79J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 759,
786 (1988).
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to waiver or forfeiture-to confront the witnesses against him,
whoever they may be."'" 8 Just as a defendant who enjoys his Sixth
Amendment right to counsel and directs his counsel to cross-
examine adverse witnesses has exercised his confrontation right, so
too would a pro se defendant whose standby counsel conducts the
cross-examination of an impressionable witness.
In short, as long as the defendant is physically present at his trial
and has counsel zealously representing his interests, the confronta-
tion right is protected. Consequently, the confrontation right may
not be implicated at all by appointing standby counsel to conduct
cross-examination. That said, courts are becoming more aware of
the serious implications of the confrontation right, and a judge
would probably consider Sixth Amendment confrontation issues
should a scenario like the one proposed here arise.
3. Consistent with the Forfeiture Doctrine
The proposal is also supported by the principles underlying the
theory of forfeiture."9 When the accused uses tactics to intimidate
a witness from testifying as a result of his self-representation in
court, he has effectively forfeited both the right to proceed pro se
in this context and to personally confront the witnesses against
him: "If the inability of the witness to testify under these proce-
dures is attributable to wrongdoing by the accused, then the
accused may be deemed to have forfeited the confrontation
right."0
20
Wrongful conduct that would cause a criminal defendant to for-
feit his personal confrontation right "obviously includes the use of
force and threats, but it has also been held to include persuasion
and control by a defendant ... and a defendant's direction to a
witness to exercise the fifth amendment privilege."'12' This Note is
more concerned with the defendant improperly using his pro se
right in order to tacitly or directly intimidate the witnesses against
him from testifying truthfully. Once a judge finds pre-trial that ei-
ther the defendant is using the pro se right purposely to intimidate
witnesses, or that the great weight of the evidence suggests that the
118. Friedman & McCormack, supra note 7, at 1231.
119. See supra Part II.B. It is widely accepted that the guarantees of the confrontation
right can be restricted in the face of forfeiture by the defendant.
120. Friedman & McCormack, supra note 7, at 1241.
121. Deborah Tuerkheimer, A Relational Approach to Confrontation and Its Loss, 15J. L. &
POL'Y 725, 743 n.58 (2007) (quoting Steele v. Taylor, 684 F.2d 1193, 1201 (6th Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1053 (1983)).
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witness would not be able to testify truthfully under cross-
examination from the defendant, standby counsel should then be
employed for that specific cross-examination. If there was not evi-
dence pre-trial to prove the defendant's tactics, but a judge finds
during trial that the defendant is behaving inappropriately, he
would be justified in limiting the defendant's rights.1 22
Even though "[a] judicial finding of forfeiture results in the ad-
mission at trial of out-of-court statements that would otherwise be
excluded pursuant to the Confrontation Clause,"'13 under the cur-
rent proposal, the defendant does not forfeit his right to exclude
inadmissible statements. His standby counsel can still employ any
tactics permissible under the rules of evidence or criminal proce-
dure to cross-examine adverse witnesses and exclude evidence.
What the defendant "forfeits," rather, is his right to proceed pro se
and to use his confrontation right to improperly intimidate a wit-
ness. Essentially, the confrontation right here is still preserved:
inadmissible testimony is still excluded and witnesses are still re-
quired to testify in open court subject to cross-examination. The
defendant's standby counsel can ensure that crucial evidence is
properly admitted or excluded. If the witness will be more likely,
under a standard of clear and convincing evidence, to give truthful
testimony in the absence of any direct intimidation from the de-
fendant (who may, in some instances, be her alleged attacker), the
trial court just aids its general truth-seeking goal by enabling a wit-
ness to testify under the strict cross-examination of standby counsel
without the unlawful intimidation by the defendant.
CONCLUSION
The Confrontation Clause aims to protect cross-examination and
to encourage complete and accurate fact-finding at trial. These dual
interests are served when an accused defendant is precluded from
directly cross-examining and bullying the alleged victim of his crime
on the stand. As the Sixth Amendment rights to confrontation and
self-representation are not absolute, a trial judge could encourage
the truthful testimony of a victim or witness by appointing standby
counsel to conduct certain cross-examinations without violating the
defendant's rights. It is imperative that the confrontation right for
the defendant be preserved. If the defendant has forfeited his right
122. For more on this, see discussion supra Part I.B. This Note's proposal is far less se-
vere than the restrictions the Court permitted in A//en.
123. Tuerkheimer, supra note 113, at 744.
[VOL. 42:3
SPRING 2009] "An Opportunity for Effective Cross-Examination" 745
to self-representation, he still is entitled to the right to have his at-
torney thoroughly cross-examine his accusers. In order to achieve
the truth-seeking goals of our criminal justice system, however, a
court may lawfully regulate the Sixth Amendment rights of a pro se
defendant.
It is true that "the confrontation clause ordinarily disdains limi-
tations upon cross-examination and upon face-to-face
confrontation.' ' 24 While limits upon the confrontation right are
typically scorned, requiring standby counsel to conduct certain
cross-examinations is unlike other limits on the confrontation
right. With the use of standby counsel, witness statements are al-
ways subject to a rigorous cross-examination. The only limit is on
which party conducts the actual cross-examination. Justice Scalia,
the architect of the modern Confrontation Clause revolution on
the Supreme Court, has noted that "the Confrontation Clause
does not guarantee reliable evidence; it guarantees specific trial
procedures that were thought to assure reliable evidence."'25 Here,
the specific trial procedure, cross-examination, is left intact.
When the nexus of the self-representation and confrontation
rights results in a defendant directly cross-examining his alleged
victims, this can be tantamount to witness intimidation or coer-
cion. While this Note does not advocate a per se rule that would
prohibit defendants from ever directly cross-examining victims or
witnesses of violent crime, it does recognize that when the defen-
dant engaging in cross-examination would result in the
intimidation of a witness, standby counsel should be appointed.
This is not to suggest, however, that the rules of evidence or pro-
cedure should be relaxed when dealing with vulnerable witnesses
or victims of crime. The confrontation right should always remain
unbroken, in this case, through an aggressive cross-examination
from stand-by counsel. This Note suggests an alternative in which
the confrontation right is largely preserved; the only difference is
merely the vessel through which confrontation is satisfied. To
avoid the invasive and personal confrontation, standby counsel
can represent the defendant's interests. Moreover, even if the
witness is made uncomfortable from a cross-examination by the
standby counsel, that fact alone should not be enough for the de-
fendant to lose his rights. As a nation of laws, we accept some
level of discomfort from the witness in order to preserve the con-
frontation right. It goes too far, however, to give the defendant
124. Haddad, supra note 72, at 94.
125. Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 862 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting), quoted in Lilly v.
Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 142 (1992) (Breyer, J., concurring).
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direct access to his alleged victim in a way that is disruptive both
to the trial process and the witness' well-being.
